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THE NEW BANKING LEGISLATION: THE
FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Phil Gramm*
HANK you very much John. I do come from an academic back-
ground, so I feel very comfortable in a room like this. I taught
economics for twelve years at Texas A&M.
We have been debating now for nearly a half a century about what is
today called a Financial Services Modernization Bill. What this bill basi-
cally does is it goes back and undoes a decision that we made in the 1930s
where we erected walls between banking and securities. We were never
able over that sixty-three year period to pass a bill to basically allow a
financial services supermarket. The main reason was that the three pil-
lars of the American economy-banking, securities, and insurance-each
wanted to keep the other competitor out of their marketplace. Now what
has changed that has produced the situation where the odds are probably
about seventy-five or eighty percent that we are this year going to enact
the Financial Services Modernization Bill? Well I would like to say it is
great leadership with me as the new chairman of the banking committee,
but the plain truth is, I am pretty much a bit player. The change is that
these barriers that were erected as part of depression year legislation
have over the years been altered by innovative regulators, and they now
look like very thin slices of Swiss cheese. They have all kinds of holes in
them. What is happening is that these industries are competing against
each other, but in very convoluted, inefficient ways. What really hap-
pened at the end of the last Congress was that a decision was made simul-
taneously in all three major industries that they were already competing
with each other. They were competing on a very inefficient, costly basis;
the time had come to lower these barriers and have full-blown competi-
tion. Interestingly enough, in our struggle to pass this important bill,
which will be the most important banking bill in sixty years, the problem
is not with the substance of the bill. There is virtually no debate other
than a handful of people who basically believe it was a mistake to tear
down the Berlin wall and who believe that government really works, and
that it is a fluke that capitalism prevailed and collectivism failed. But
other than this very, very small group of people whose views are only in
* This speech was delivered by Senator Phil Gramm on Friday, September 24, 1999,
at SMU School of Law
SMU LAW REVIEW
vogue in Washington DC, there is no debate about the fundamental thesis
in the bill. The debate is about how to do it and about other issues that
come into play when you pass a major banking bill.
Let me touch very briefly on those issues, and I will try to do it pretty
quickly so that I can deviate from my background as a school teacher and
spend most of the time trying to answer your questions.
The first issue is a very important issue, and that is, should new finan-
cial services be provided outside the bank in a holding company affiliate
or should they be provided within the bank? This is a tough enough issue
in and of itself, but you have an overlay on it in that the Treasury Depart-
ment is under Secretary Rubin, the first Treasury Secretary in the history
of this country, at least since 1913, who has believed that we made a mis-
take in the Federal Reserve Act in taking regulatory power over the
banking system away from the executive branch of government and giv-
ing it to an independent agency, in this case, the Federal Reserve Bank.
Rubin believed that we should take some of that power back and basi-
cally give the bulk of bank regulation to the President under the Treasury
Department. So you have several issues. One, was the Federal Reserve
Act a mistake, and, if so, should we partially overturn it? My answer is
no. I think the Federal Reserve Act has worked well. I think the in-
dependent monetary authority that we have in this country is the envy of
the world, and I do not want to see that overturned, especially in a bill
that in all probability will have my name on it.
Second, besides the issue of who should regulate banks, you have the
fundamental issues of safety, soundness, and an issue that is even more
important to me, trying to create a level playing surface. I believe, as
Alan Greenspan believes, that banks, because of FDIC insurance, be-
cause of access to credit at the lowest cost of any institutions in America,
and because of the ability to use the Federal Reserve to transfer funds on
a risk-free basis, have an effective subsidy of about ten basis points as
compared with other financial institutions that do not basically share
these benefits. Now that has not made any difference to this point be-
cause we really limited the focus in America of what banks could do. But
I believe that if you let banks provide expanded financial services within
the bank itself, with a ten basis point advantage over your competitors,
you can rule the world. And I think what will happen if we adopt the
Administration's operating subsidiaries provision, or in English, letting
banks provide expanded financial services as part of the bank itself, is
that there could be a tendency for a concentration of what we have
known as insurance products and what we have known as securities prod-
ucts. We could end up with a situation somewhat like Japan where our
financial market would be dominated by a few relatively large banks.
The third issue is about as important and is a lot more political, and it is
called "community reinvestment." The Community Reinvestment Act
(CRA) was adopted in 1977 when the then chairman of the banking com-
mittee added a little rider on a housing bill that required banks to provide
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loans in the communities where they collect deposits. It was debated in
committee, this was before I ever got to Congress, and there was a vote
when a democrat senator opposed it, there was a vote in committee to
take it out of the bill and that vote failed on a tie vote. That was the
beginning of what we know as the CRA. That Act had very humble be-
ginnings, it produced a very small program that was aimed at nudging
banks to be more responsive to providing loans in their service territory,
especially loans to low-income and minority customers. But what has
happened over the years is that since you have to get CRA approval in
order to merge or close a branch or open a branch with all of the changes
in the American banking industry since 1989, and with a change in the
enforcement procedures under President Clinton, the CRA today allo-
cates more capital than Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler combined.
CRA is now bigger than the discretionary budget of the federal govern-
ment. CRA is bigger than the Canadian economy. It is one of the largest
capital allocation programs in the world.
We have had things occur under CRA that no one ever envisioned. No
one would have ever thought when CRA was written in Congress that
you would have banks pay cash, $9.5 billion, to self-appointed community
groups and to individuals in return for their agreement not to protest the
action the bank wanted to take. The simple arithmetic of a CRA protest
is that, on average, a protest delays a merger by sixty days. When you
have announced a merger, stock prices of both banks are fluctuating, and
a sixty-day delay can cost you millions of dollars. So what has happened
is that the protest often boils down to assertions that the bank is racist
and the president of the bank is a loan shark. These protesters have basi-
cally forced banks, with the complicity of the federal government, to pay
out $9.5 billion in cash payments to people who are totally unaccountable
to the public for the uses to which those funds are put. These agreements
are almost all private, so the public never knows the payment has been
made, and the person who got the payment is not accountable. Now, this
is a big issue, and it is a very big issue with me. I see this as, in many
cases, little more than extortion.
So, what I am trying to do is to make some simple changes and here
they are.
First, a sunshine provision that says that in the future, when a bank
enters into an agreement that transfers anything of value that is worth
$10,000 or more as part of CRA enforcement to anybody, that agreement
has to be made public. While no one is willing to stand up and debate
this issue, it is adamantly opposed.
Second, some banks have long histories of being in compliance with the
law. They get audited every year. They get rated as to whether they are
satisfactory, excellent, need improvement, or are substantially out of
compliance. And so the second CRA provision that is in the Senate bill
says that if you have a long history of being in compliance with CRA, if
you have been in compliance the last three audits, you are assumed to be
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in compliance when you apply for the right to merge or acquire or do
something else, and you are assumed to be innocent until proven guilty.
So anybody can file a protest, but the bank's application cannot be denied
or cannot be delayed simply because somebody says that the bank fails to
comply with CRA. A protester will be required to provide substantial
evidence of the allegation made. And as many of you know, substantial
evidence is probably the most defined term in American jurisprudence.
The two definitions by the Supreme Court and their rulings I like best
are: (1) more than a "mere scintilla," and (2) enough evidence that a
reasonable person might believe your position.
Third, there is a CRA provision in the Senate bill that has to do, and it
is the hardest to debate, with very small banks that are located outside
standard metropolitan areas and have deposits of less than $100 million.
These banks often have between eight and twelve or fifteen employees.
Under CRA, they have to have a CRA compliance officer. They are au-
dited every year. Those audits may cost, we do not quite know, but they
may cost as much as a billion dollars. And over a nine-year period in
16,000 audits, only three of these little banks have been found to be sub-
stantially out of compliance. And so our bill says that if you are a little
bitty bank and you are outside of a metropolitan area so that you do not
have a town to serve, much less an inner-city, that you ought to be ex-
empt from CRA. Now, critics say, well that is thirty-eight percent of the
bank charters, to which I say, yes but it is only two point seven percent of
total banking assets in the United States. So how does it make sense to
spend forty-six percent of your enforcement effort on two point seven
percent of the capital.
Now, let me touch one other issue and there are a lot of others, and I
will throw it open for questions. The final mega-issue, as I would say,
here is the whole privacy issue. It is interesting that we have been debat-
ing this bill really off and on for fifty years. This is the first time privacy
has ever become an issue. And it really boils down to what kind of pri-
vacy should you have in the electronic age? I believe this is a very serious
issue. I think it is one that deserves a lot of attention. I think we need to
have a comprehensive set of hearings, and I think we ought to pass a bill
on privacy as an independent bill. But no matter what I think, the House
has privacy provisions on the bill. And basically, we are trying to look at
those to decide what we want to do, whether it should be part of this bill,
whether it should be part of a free-standing bill, but I will tell you basi-
cally my position on privacy. My position on privacy is very simple. If a
bank tells me their policy, they fulfil my privacy requirements because I
do not have to bank with them. There is enough competition in banking
that if people do not want information about them shared with Neiman
Marcus so that they get a Christmas catalogue or with Sports Illustrated if
they are heavy buyers of sporting goods or things of that nature, banks
will acquire customers by saying we won't share our list. Now that basi-
cally is as simple as I can state my position on that issue.
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Now there are a whole lot of other issues, some large, some small. We
have passed a bill in the House. We have passed the bill in the Senate.
They are different on each of these issues and so we are in conference. In
fact, we have had half a dozen meetings beginning to try to work out the
differences. My guess is that we will work out the differences, and we will
pass a bill. And when we do, I think we are going to see a tremendous
change in financial institutions in the country, which makes sense. We are
going through a period where information is more broadly available than
ever in history. The cost of acquiring it and using it is at the lowest level
in American history, and the fact that that would revolutionize financial
services is hardly startling.
So with that let me stop and I will be happy to answer any questions.
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